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means a "new" debate, but it takes on a
new shape in the rather special condi-
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tions of cyberspace-or so, at least, I
hope to suggest in what follows.
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Last January, Professor Tom Field of
the

Franklin

Pierce

Law

Center

(FPLC), posted the following message
to the Cyberprof listserve: 1
70

To all:
Assuming that this message isn't screened out
by the [the server at the University of Texas
that hosts the Cyberprof discussion group],
you might be interested in a "small" problem
FPLC faces. A few weeks ago, someone
"bounced" some spam off our server. It somehow corrupted our email system, and [now] I
am beginning to get messages like this:
The message that you sent was undeliverable to the following: ipww@ljx.com
Transcript of session follows: AL4IL
FROM: tfield@fplc.edu refused; see
http://maps.vix.com/rbl/
I hope it never happens to you. Meanwhile,
2
any ideas about how to deal with it?

The Explanation

network administrators on a subscription basis. 9 ISPs
that subscribe to the RBL can, if they choose, set their
mail handlers to delete all e-mail originating from,
and/or going to, an address appearing on the list. That
is, when an RBL-subscribing ISP receives a request to
transmit e-mail to or from a subscriber, it checks the
sender's numeric Internet address against the list of
blackholed Internet addresses; if it finds a match, it
deletes the message. The blackholed address thus, in a
sense, disappears from the Internet as far as the subscribing ISP (and its customers) are concerned.
Apparently, Professor Field's network-fplc.edu-had
been placed on the RBL-"blackholed -and ljx.com, the
home server of the intended recipient of Professor Field's
e-mail, was an RBL subscriber. When the ljx.com mail
server received Professor Field's message, it recognized
the e-mail as originating from a blackholed address and
deleted it, helpfully sending back the message, reproduced above, to Professor Field to inform him what was
going on.

There were, as it turned out, lots of ideas about how to
deal with it - but that is getting ahead of myself. First,
the facts, as best one can make them out here. Professor
Field ("tfield@fplc.edu") had sent an e-mail message to an

The Question

address at ljx.com. But the ljx.com e-mail server had
refused to deliver the message to the intended recipient
("Mail From: tfield@fplc.edu refused") and returned it
"undelivered" to Professor Field. What had happened?

mailing operations-that is, we might agree, a serious, or

Why had it done so?
The explanation is provided-elliptically, to be sureby the hyperlink reference ("see http://maps.vix.com/rbl")
in the message that Professor Field had received. If you
do indeed "see http://maps.vix.com/rbl" you are taken to
the home page of something called the Mail Abuse
Prevention System (MAPS). MAPS, the primary focus of
this tale, is a California non-profit limited liability com-

What are we to make of things like the RBL? Here we
have a problem-the proliferation of unsolicited mass eat least a non-trivial, one. At just the moment that email has become an indispensable form of communication, of incalculable commercial and non-commercial
importance for a substantial and ever-growing segment
of the world community, its value is being undermined by
a barrage of unwanted and unsolicited communications. 10 But is the RBL a reasonable means of addressing this problem? To what extent can we, and should we,
rely on things like the RBL to devise a "solution" (however we might define a solution) to that problem?

pany. 3 It coordinates a kind of group boycott by Internet

The Debate

service providers (ISPs) for the purpose of reducing the
flow of what is commonly called "spam"- unsolicited
bulk e-mail. It operates, roughly, as follows. 4 The man-

The question is, I think, both an interesting and an
important one. Legal scholars have recently discovered-or re-discovered-the important role played by

agers of MAPS create and maintain what they call the
"Realtime Blackhole List" (RBL), which consists of a long

informal systems of decentralized,

list of Internet addresses. 5 They place on the RBL any
Internet address from which, to their knowledge, spam

consensus-based

social control in shaping human social behavior.1 1 It is
becoming increasingly clear that systems of rules and

has originated. 6 They also place on the RBL the address

sanctions created and administered without reliance on
State "authority," and outside of any formal State-man-

of any network that allows "open-mail relay" 7 or provides "spam support services."8
MAPS makes the RBL list available to ISPs and other

aged process-"norms-are powerful determinants of
behavior in many contexts. And what is the RBL if not a
textbook example of an informal, decentralized, norm-

creation process? The MAPS operators propose a norm,
a description of behavior that they consider, for whatever reason, unacceptable-allowing open mail relay systems, for example, or providing "spam support services. '"12 They offer to serve as your agent-or, more

responsibility for maintaining these databases -at least,
for three of the increasingly popular "generic top-level"
domains--*.com, *.net, *.org and the like-was handed over
to a private firm, Network Solutions, Inc., under a contractstyled a "Cooperative Agreement-funded by the U.S. gov-

accurately, as the agent for your network administrator
or ISP-in identifying those who are violating this norm.
They offer to keep you informed of those identifications
(via the RBL). They propose to sanction norm-violators.
The sanction they have in mind is the Ur-Sanction of

ernment (first through the National Science Foundation,
later through the Commerce Department's National
Telecommunications and Information Administration).

informal social control processes: shunning. Those who
choose to apply the sanction simply turn their backs on
offenders, ceasing all (electronic) communication with
them. MAPS helpfully provides you with the means
to accomplish this sanction-software that will configure your system to delete e-mail to or from black13
holed addresses.
This is not, as it were, your father's norm-creation
process; it has some unusual features missing from realspace norm-creation processes. 14 But it is norm-creation;
whether or not it can helpfully be described as "bottomup," 15 it is surely both "informal" and "decentralized."
Neither the decision to join (or not join) the group shunning exercise (i.e., to subscribe to the RBL in the first
place), nor the shunning sanction imposed on violators of
the norm, relies on access to (formal) State-supported
16
enforcement devices or State-imposed legal sanctions,
and the decision whether to join that exercise is in the
hands of a (relatively large) number of independently17
acting agents.
Conditions in cyberspace do seem to create, in
Professor Elkin-Koren's words, "new opportunities for
voluntary normative regimes" of this kind. 18 Not surprisingly, conflicts between formal and informal, centralized and decentralized, rule-making processes are at the
heart of many of the important and challenging cyberspace policy debates. The extraordinary current turmoil
in the domain name allocation system is one illustration.
The story has been told in detail elsewhere. 1 9 Briefly, in
the beginning-before the Internet became such a Big
Deal-responsibility for operating the machines, and the
databases on those machines, that correctly route
Internet messages fell to the Internet Assigned Number
Authority (IANA), an imposing-sounding entity that, in
reality, consisted of a small number of dedicated volunteers in southern California. As the Internet began its
explosive growth, IANA's ability to maintain the system
became increasingly overloaded; beginning in 1993,

When that cooperative agreement was due to expire in
1998, the Commerce Department had a decision to make.
It could simply walk away from the relationship on the
stated expiration date, which is ordinarily what happens
when cooperative agreements (or any government contracts) expire. It rejected that option, however, taking
the position that it would be "irresponsible to withdraw
from its existing management role [in the domain name
system] without taking steps to ensure the stability of
the Internet. '20 The Internet naming system, it concluded, needed a "more formal and robust management structure," and it called for the creation of a new, not-for-profit corporation formed by the "Internet stakeholders"
21
themselves to manage the domain name system.
Shortly thereafter, control of this system was placed in
the hands of a single institution - now known as
ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers-which would have overall responsibility
for setting the rules under which the domain name system would henceforth operate. Putting aside whatever
one might think of this decision (or the manner in which
ICANN has fulfilled its responsibilities 2 2), the decision to
centralize authority over this system in a single, government-authorized entity will inevitably have deep implications for the Internet as a whole.
The debate over the normative implications of these
informal processes has become a lively one indeed. In
one corner are commentators, myself included, who find
these systems normatively attractive, on both "legitimacy and "efficiency" grounds. 23 Legitimacy justifications
rest on the view that informal private ordering schemes
like the RBL are a "superior alternative to centralized
government models in that [they are] the most consistent
with autonomy and freedom." 2 4 By these lights, MAPS is
normatively attractive inasmuch as it constrains individuals' behavior only to the extent, and precisely to the
extent, that others share MAPS' views on the definition
of wrongdoing, the choice of appropriate sanction, the
identity of the wrongdoers, etc; the MAPS operators can
persuade, cajole, and beg the thousands of ISPs to sub-

scribe to the RBL, but they cannot force them to do so in
any meaningful sense of that term. Efficiency justifications rest on the extraordinary power of decentralized
systems to generate, by means of repeated trial-anderror and the pull-and-tug of competing rules and
counter-rules, solutions to complex problems that can be
25
found no other way.

would we go about building something as ridiculously
complex as a single interconnected global communications network? Who would we place in charge of such a
project? How would we solve the seemingly impossible
coordination problem facing anyone trying to construct
that global network-constructing, and getting large
numbers of people to adopt, what amounts to a single
28
global language?
Of course, we did, somehow, solve it, without any
"authority" in charge of bringing it into being, in a
remarkably short period of time, and to the surprise of

Others disagree, both with particular reference to
institutions like the RBL 2 6 and in general, 2 7 arguing
both that the efficiency benefits of these cyberspace
norm-creation processes are overblown and that such

virtually everyone. 2 9 A decentralized process of developamong
ing consensus

processes systematically exclude "public values" from
being incorporated into
the norms they generate.
It is a rich debate that
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will, I suspect, be one of
the enduring legacies of
the study of the law of
to put
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We like to think, at least at a conceptual level, that we
conduct this debate by placing decentralized rule-making
processes (like the RBL) on the table, dissecting their features, and comparing them, on whatever normative or
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orientation), the
Wide
World
Consortium 3i,

Web
the

Assigned
Internet
Numbering Authority3 2 ,
and the like-institutions

with no authority whatsoever to act on anyone's behalf,
no fixed address or membership, no formal legal existence-somehow got hundreds of millions of individuals
across the globe to agree on a common syntax for their

electronic conversations. The protocols of the global network, like the natural languages they so closely resemble, emerged from a process that was at its core
unplanned and undirected. Though we can certainly
point ex post to many individuals and institutions who
explain the sorts of things I have in mind.
First, I would suggest that we understand little-far played particularly important roles in its emergence, ex
less than we need to--about the processes of self-ordering ante there was no one we could have pointed to as
and informal coordination. The rise of the Internet itself charged with "creating" the set of rules we now know as
shows us, I think, how little we know about the ways that the Internet, any more than we can point to any one indidecentralized, trial-and-error, consensual processes can vidual or institution charged with creating the set of
descriptive criteria we choose, with alternative processes.
But there are serious impediments to our ability to do
that, impediments that skew the inquiry into the virtues
(or lack thereof) of decentralized processes. Let me try to

build stable structures of literally unimaginable complexity and power. If cyberspace did not exist, we would
all probably agree that it could not exist. How, after all,

rules for English syntax.
Could it have been built any other way? My instinct is
that it could not have, that only an "authority-free"

process of this kind could have constructed this system,
that no one with the authority to build the Internet could
have done so.3 3 If I'm right, this is of considerable importance to the normative debate, for it obliterates the distinction between the normative and the descriptive
aspects of the debate; if we were trying, circa 1965, to
find the "best" way of constructing the protocols for the
Internet, we would not lay alternative centralized and

location is of little significance, have long since passed
into cliche; but that doesn't mean that they are not real
problems. Whose rules regarding spam should we be
comparing to MAPS'? The Virginia legislature's 36? The
The International
United States Congress' 37?
Telecommunications Union's? UNESCO's? ICANN's?
The task of identifying the alternative rule-makers for
purposes of normative comparison is made even more dif-

decentralized decision-making models side-by-side for
comparison, for there would be no centralized model to
examine that could accomplish the task. But this is, I

ficult than this because cyberspace, having emerged from
decentralized disorder-from the primordial ooze of the
Internet Engineering Task Force - may well create con-

admit, just instinct; I do not know of any analytic vocabulary or framework within which I could make that argument. Even if my instinct is correct, how would we have

ditions that favor the growth of powerful centralizing
forces. 38 The State of Virginia will soon discover that its
anti-spam statute has little effect on the amount of spam
that its citizens receive,
because while spam origi-

known that in 1965? How
would we know it now?
Second, and relatedly, I
believe that conditions in
cyberspace make it difficult to specify the alternative processes with which
decentralized processes
are to be compared as part
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of this policy calculus. No
one, of course, suggests
decentralized
that
processes like the one of
which the RBL is a part
constitute
rule-making
Nirvana.
The relevant
normative question is always whether processes of this
kind are better-however one chooses to define "better"34
than available alternatives.
We need, in other words, to be debating whether the
process of which RBL is a part is better than-than
what? As I look over the contributions to this debate I'm
not always sure I can fill in that blank. Some of this is
mere rhetorical device; it is always tempting to seize the
rhetorical high ground by demonstrating the substantial
distance between an opponent's position and perfection
itself.3 5 But there is a deeper problem here. Cyberspace
is particularly, and genuinely, tricky on this score. What
are the alternative rule-making processes or institutions
that should be placed on the analytic table alongside the
RBL? The problems posed by the borderless features of
this new medium for traditional rule-making institutions, faced with the problem of mapping territoriallybased legal regimes onto a medium in which physical
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way into Virginia,
originating elsewhere-i.e., outside of

]"Virginia's
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borders-is
to
immune

Virginia's control. 3 9

The

same will be true in
regard to a federal antispam statute (if such a
statute is enacted), just on
a grander scale. We can

already write the headline: "Use of Offshore E-Mail Servers Hinders
Enforcement of Federal Spam Statute; Government Calls
for International Cooperation to Solve 'Serious Problem."'
We will, inevitably (and, since we're on Internet Time,
sooner than we think), hear calls for "international harmonization" of spam regulation, replicating the pattern
currently spreading across the cyberspace legal spectrum. How can we factor this into the normative comparisons we are trying to make?
Third and finally, if all this weren't confusing enough,
decentralized processes are fundamentally, and irreducibly, unpredictable. No one can say ex ante what kind
of anti-spam rules will emerge from the RBL process, or
how the domain name allocation system would today be
operating had the Commerce Department chosen to step
aside in 1998, because that information does not exist
unless and until the process itself generates it. No one can
say whether MAPS' initiative will, or will not, cause open

else, ensuring the stability of the Internet. The
Internet functions well today, but its current
technical management is probably not viable
over the long term. We should not wait for it to
break down before acting. Yet, we should not

mail relay systems to disappear, because that depends
upon the response of thousands of individual system
administrators; no one can say whether alternative and
as yet untried and perhaps unthought-of means of deterring spammers will prove more popular than MAPS; no
one can say how spammers will react to the absence of
open-mail relay (or to these other alternatives) or how
the anti-spammers will react to those reactions, etc.
Because we can not see, or imagine, where the RBL
might take us-the rule(s) of spamming that the RBL
and its variants could produce-we cannot lay these
rules side-by-side with their centralized alternatives for
purposes of analysis, deliberation, and debate. Our analytic table contains only, as it were, the bad news: the
inherently disordered and aggravating messiness of
decentralized processes, mail that doesn't reach its
intended destination, disruptions of service, and the like.
It all makes for an apparently simple policy choice:
order versus chaos. During all of the discussions-which
can only be described as "frenzied"-leading up to the
decision to grant ICANN the authority to manage the
domain name system, I was continually struck by the
impossibility of discussing rationally the course of action
whereby the government would just walk away from the
entire thing. The Commerce Department set forth a
number of principles to guide its decision; the domain
name system should "support competition and consumer

move so quickly, or depart so radically from
the existing structures, that we disrupt the
functioning of the Internet. The introduction of
a new system should not disrupt current oper41
ations, or create competing root systems.
The decentralized process that built the Internet protocols and the domain name system cannot, ex ante,
"ensur[e] the stability of the Internet." If that is indeed
the goal, that option is off the table. Because there is no
way to answer the question "What kind of domain name
system would we have today had the Commerce
Department stepped aside in 1998?," that course of
action could not be taken seriously.
My fear is that this leads to a policy-making catastrophe of significant proportions. A "stable" Internet is one
locked in place, incapable of generating innovative
responses to the very problems that it is itself bringing
into existence. The very existence of the Internet should
caution us against dismissing too quickly the notion that
there are some problems that are best solved by these
messy, disordered, semi-chaotic, unplanned, decentralized systems, and that the costs that necessarily accom-

choice," "reflect, as far as possible, the bottom-up gover- pany such unplanned disorder may sometimes be worth
42
But which problems? How can we know? *
nance that has characterized development of the Internet bearing.
to date," and "reflect the diversity of [the Internet's]
Postd@erols.com: An earlier version of this paper was originally preusers and their needs" by "ensur[ing] international input sented at the Yale Information Society Project Conference on "Private
in decision making."40 But one principle was primus Censorship/Perfect Choice," April 9, 1999. Thanks to Bill Scheinler for
inter pares:
The U.S. government should end its role in the
Internet number and name address systems in

research assistance, and to the Temple Law School summer research
grant fund for support in completing this paper.

a responsible manner. This means, above all
1 Cyberprof is a listserve discussion group moderated by Professor
Mark Lemley of the University of California-Berkeley.
2

E-mail from Tom Field, Professor, Franklin Pierce Law Center, to

Cyberprof Discussion Group, Jan. 28, 1999 (thanks to Professor Field
for his permission to quote the message here) (copy on file with the
author).
See Robert McMillan, What Will Stop Spam? (last modified Nov.
20, 1999) <http://www.sunworld.com/sunworldonline/swol-121997/swol-12-vixie.html>. See renerallv Mail Abuse Prevention
System (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://mail-abuse.org>; Maps Realtime
Blackhole List (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://maps.vix.com/rbl>.

5 The RBL currently has approximately 1,400 entries. E-mail from
Nick Nicholas, Executive Director, Mail Abuse Prevention System, to
David G. Post (Oct. 6, 1999) (on file with author). Most of these
entries consist of only a single numeric Internet address; some, however, consist of the address of what is commonly called a "Class C"
network, which itself contains 255 individual addresses. See Paul
Vixie, AL4PS RBL Candidacy (visited Nov. 19, 1999)
<http://maps.vix.com/rbl/candidacy.html>.

3

4

See generally, Mail Abuse, supra note 3.

6

See Vixie, supra note 5. Removal from the list requires a showing

by the blackholed address, or the appropriate network administrator,
that the spammer is no longer at the address in question and/or that
a stronger "Terms of Use" agreement has been put in place for the
network on which the spammer was located. Id.

7

"Open-mail relay" refers to a practice whereby Internet mail
servers process and transmit e-mail messages in circumstances in
which neither the sender nor the recipient is an authenticated local
user; that is, it allows "strangers" to access its mail handling facilities.
Spammers, apparently, utilize open-mail relay sites to "launder" their
e-mail; by using an open relay, their e-mail will appear to have originated from a source other than the true source, thereby making it difficult to trace or filter the messages. See Better Network Security
Through Peer Pressure: Stopping Smurf and Spam (visited May 31,
1999) <http://securityportal.com/cover/coverstory19990531.html>; Paul
Hoffman, Allowing Relaying in SMTP: A Series of Surveys (visited
Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www.imc.org/ube-relay.html>; Chip Rosenthal,
MAPS TSI Anti-Relay: What is Third-PartyMail Relay? (visited July
31, 1999) <http://maps.vix.com/tsi/ar-what.html>; Vixie, supra note 5.
8 MAPS includes in this category such activities as hosting web
pages that are listed as destination addresses in bulk e-mail, or providing e-mail forwarders or auto-responders that can be used by bulk
e-mailers. See Vixie, supra note 5.
9 There is currently no charge to subscribe to the RBL. See Nick
Nicholas & Chip Rosenthal, MAPS RBL Participants(visited Nov. 19,
1999) <http://maps.vix.com/rbl/participants.html>. The RBL currently
has over 180 registered subscribers who receive full, frequently updated copies of the RBL for storage and use on their own routers and
servers. These subscribers are required to execute a license agreement
with MAPS, the terms of which are not publicly available. Id. In
addition, there are "several thousand" other users who either receive
the RBL via "EBGP4 Multi-Hop," a protocol used by routers on the
Internet, or through direct queries on specific numeric Internet
address to MAPS' RBL servers. Id.
10

Some have suggested -

plausibly -

that the explosion of mass e-

mail is undermining the viability and even the existence of many open
discussion forums (in particular, many Usenet newsgroups) - one of
the Internet's earliest and most remarkable innovations. See Paul K.
Ohm, Comment, On Regulating the Internet: Usenet, A Case Study, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1941, 1951 (1999) (noting that spam causes a dramatic
decrease in Usenet's "signal-to-noise" ratio and is therefore considered
a "major threat" to [Usenet's] continued popularity).
11

See generallv, ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How

NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (arguably the start of the rejuvenation of the study of norms within legal scholarship.) The
Symposium on Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643
(1996), maps out much of the recent terrain.
12

MAPS provides an extensive rationale for its proposed norms.

See Paul Vixie, Our Rationale for the MAPS RBL (last modified July
12, 1999) <http://maps.vix.com/rbl/rationale.html>.
13

The RBL has apparently become popular enough that many of the

vendors of the most popular mail server configuration software provide support for RBL implementation in their products. See Paul
Vixie, (visited Jan. 5, 2000) <http://maps.vix.com/rbl/usage.html>.
14

The implementation in software of this particular norm is surely

an unusual feature of this process that has no clear analogue in realspace norm-creation schemes. Enforcement of norms by code is, as
Professor Lessig has demonstrated, a large, and a most fundamental
change. See LAwRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAwS OF CYBERSPACE
(1999). Cyberspace, in Lessig's words,
... demands a new understanding of how regulation
works and of what regulates life there. It compels us to
look beyond the traditional lawyer's scope - beyond

laws, regulations, and norms. ... In cyberspace we must
understand how code regulates - how the software and
hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate cyberspace as it is. As William Mitchell puts it, this code is
cyberspace's "law." Code is law.
Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
15

Margaret Radin and R. Polk Wagner criticize what they describe

as a "false dichotomy" between characterizations of "top-down" and
"bottom-up" ordering. See Margaret Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The
Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1297 (1998). Any rule-making regime,
they suggest, "can be characterized as either [top-down or bottom-up],
depending upon how you look at it." Id. at 1298. The point is an
important one; rule-making processes are always top-down when seen
from one level of the hierarchy of social institutions and bottom-up
when seen from a different level. MAPS's decision-making process is
top-down from the perspective of, say, the MAPS webmaster, who
receives from " higher up" a list of sites to put on, or take off, the RBL
each morning. This top-down process is simultaneously a component
of a bottom-up process from the perspective of someone looking at the
responses of the Internet community as a whole to the proliferation of
commercial e-mail. This is a feature of all networks (including social
networks) consisting of embedded hierarchies; any element in the network is simultaneously at the top of some hierarchy(ies) and at the
bottom of others. See David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is
the Coastlineof the Law? Thoughts on the FractalNature of Legal
Systems, 29 J.L.S. 545 (2000) (describing this "dizzying" characteristic
of embedded hierarchies as a consequence of their fractal structure).
16

You are not, in other words, subject to any sanction enforced

through the formal State-created processes if you choose to join, or not
to join, the MAPS exercise. If for any reason you do not approve of
MAPS' particular definition of unacceptable behavior, their choice of
sanction, the means they have chosen to implement that sanction, or
their method of detecting violators subject to the sanction, you can
ignore them (or, if you'd like, to propose your own). MAPS can persuade, cajole, and beg the thousands of ISPs out there to join the
group of RBL subscribers, but it cannot use State-sanctioned force to
get them to do so.
17

Professor Elkin-Koren defines "decentralized" norm-creation

processes as those in which the "power to create and shape ... rules
is not concentrated in the hands of any individual group, or institution [and which is] spread among various social agents." Niva ElkinKoren, Copyrights in Cyberspace - Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1998). As of June, 1999, there were over
6,000 ISPs in the United States alone offering Internet connectivity,
See Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulationof the Internet, FCC
Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 31 (last modified July,
1999)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp3l.pdf>, and
countless other network administrators in a position to subscribe (or
not) to the RBL.
18

Elkin-Koren, supra note 17, at 1161-62 (Cyberspace "significantly

reduces the costs of communicating and collecting information regarding individuals' preferences. It also facilitates fast and cost-effective
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